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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALL METALS & FASTENERS, INC., \ 
a Utah corporation, i 
Plaintiff-Respondent, I 
-vs.- f Case No. 
ASSOCIATED BOLT & SUPPLY, ) 13862 
INC., an Idaho corporation, y 
aka J &R PRODUCTS, A. WAYNE \ 
ROBINSON & FARRELL J. JONES, I 
Defendants and Appellants. I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit by Plaintiff-Respondent against Associ-
ated Bolt & Supply Company for goods sold on account 
and against Defendants and Appellants Farrell J. Jones 
and A. Wayne Robinson upon a guaranty of that account. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was granted against the Defendants as 
prayed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Only Defendants Farrell J. Jones and A. Wayne 
Robinson have appealed and seek reversal of the trial 
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court's findings that they had guaranteed the obligation 
of Associated Bolt & Supply Company to Respondent. 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' Statement of Facts lacks the detail neces-
sary to give this Court the flavor of what transpired 
between the parties and resulted in the Trial Court 
granting judgment to Respondent (herein "All Metals"). 
The first two paragraphs of Appellants' Statement of 
Facts has brought the reader to that point on January 
20, 1972 (not "Early in 1973" as stated in the first full 
paragraph on p. 3 of Appellants' brief), where the offi-
cers and attorney for All Metals were in Pocatello, Idaho, 
meeting with A. Wayne Robinson, president of Associ-
ated Bolt & Supply Co. (herein "Robinson" and "As-
sociated Bolt"), Farrell J. Jones (herein "Jones") and 
their counsel, Earl J. Peck. (R. 139, 140; 166, 167) 
As Appellants indicate in their Statement of Facts, 
the purpose of the meeting was to enable All Metals and 
its officers and attorney to obtain evidence in connection 
with its suit against All Metals' former president, Walter 
Hibbard, and F & R Enterprises and to enable Associated 
Bolt and its officers to convince All Metals that Associ-
ated Bolt and Robinson had not been involved in any 
conspiracy with Hibbard to defraud All Metals. By so 
doing, it was the desire of Associated Bolt and Robinson 
to be dismissed from the law suit (R. 138). 
Since the law suit against F & R Enterprises had, in 
effect, closed down its business and since F & R Enter-
prises had been Associated Bolt's primary source of sup-
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ply of material, at the meeting Jones requested Richard 
E. Watts (herein "Watts"), one of the officers of All 
Metals, to agree to have All Metals continue to supply 
Associated Bolt. In response, Mr. Watts said that due 
to his past experience with Associated Bolt, it would 
be necessary that some form of guaranty be furnished 
All Metals in order for it to do business with Associated 
Bolt. (R. 141) Both Jones and Robinson agreed to 
guaranty the account, according to the testimony of Mrs. 
Leslie Curtis (R. 167) and Watts (R. 141). While Jones 
denies having given the guaranty, he does not deny that 
the conversation with respect to the guaranty took place, 
or that Watts insisted on one. (R. 186,187) 
Counsel for All Metals indicated that the guaranty 
should be evidenced in writing and that he would pre-
pare a written guaranty for submission. (R. 141, 187) 
On the strength of the guaranty, All Metals began to 
supply merchandise to Associated Bolt (PI. Ex. 4). The 
written guaranty was prepared and submitted by Watts 
to Jones and Robinson in February, 1972 (R. 142; PL 
Ex. 1). It should be noted that the guaranty as submitted 
to Jones and Robinson called for each of them to guar-
antee the account of Associated Bolt to All Metals. 
In March, 1972, Jones called Watts and told him 
that the guaranty should be changed by inserting the 
words "beginning with January 1, 1972" in relation to 
the past debt of Associated Bolt. He explained to Watts 
that he felt that it was necessary to divorce the guaranty 
from any activity of Associated Bolt prior to that date. 
In this conversation, Jones also pointed out that his mid-
dle initial should be changed from A. to J. (R. 143). 
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Contemporaneous with this telephone call, Mr. Watts 
jotted down on his copy of the guaranty the changes 
which were to be made. (R. 143, 144; PL Ex. 1) Jones 
requested no other changes to the form of guaranty 
during this call. Jones' testimony regarding this telephone 
conversation deserves to be read. He had been asked 
about the conversation with Watts and the following 
examination took place in part by counsel and part by 
the Court (R. 203, 204) : 
Q. I see. So you called him and you talked 
to him, but you really didn't express indignation 
at having received a guaranty with your name on 
it, you simply said I think we ought to make some 
changes; and the changes were, put a beginning 
date, and change your name so it was accurate? 
A. I don't recall. I could have said, why did 
you put my name in there? I don't remember that 
if I mentioned it or not to him. 
THE COURT: At that time you didn't ex-
press any objections to guaranteeing the account 
of Asoociated Bolt, did you? 
THE WITNESS: I told him that if I signed 
the guaranty it would have to be changed, the 
writing. 
THE COURT: That isn't what I asked you. 
You didn't, on the phone, express any objections 
to guaranteeing Associated Bolts account? 
THE WITNESS: Not specifically, no. 
THE COURT: Well, these accounts were 
accounts they were then purchasing, not old ac-
counts, that's why you wanted the date on it? 
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THE WITNESS: Yes, I wanted a begin-
ning date. 
THE COURT: You were willing to go back 
and guarantee the accounts from January 1st on? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: That meant some deliveries 
had already been made? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm certain there were. 
The guaranty was retyped to include the changes 
requested by Jones and, as changed, was mailed to Jones 
with a letter of transmittal on March 23, 1972 (R. 144; 
PL Ex. 3). 
In reliance on the existence of the guaranty, mer-
chandise was being shipped to Associated Bolt on a con-
tinuing basis. As of March 21, 1972, the account stood 
at $3,985.19 (PI. Ex. 4) . In May, 1972, All Metals re-
ceived a check from Robinson purporting to be drawn 
on the account of "R & J Products Company." Prior to 
receipt of this check, Watts had had a telephone con-
versation with Robinson who told him that he was send-
ing a check drawn on "J & R Products" to Watts to 
apply on the account. Watts testimony was that it was 
understood between Robinson and himself that this would 
apply on the Associated Bolt account because that was 
the only account that All Metals had with Robinson. 
There was no account with J & R Products. (R. 151, 
152) The check of J & R Products when received actu-
ally said R & J Products for the same address as that 
previously used by Associated Bolt and was drawn on an 
account on which Farrell ones was a signator. (PL Exs. 
5 and 8) A later check was reecived by All Metals ap-
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parently printed on the same form, bearing the same 
bank account number, but on which the R & J had been 
stricken and J & R had been written in pen over it. 
(PL Ex. 6) 
Late in June, 1972, Jones called Watts and stated 
that he had further changes to make in the guaranty, 
to-wit: that name "J & R Products" be substituted for 
"Associated Bolt & Supply Co." (R. 145, 146, 190) At 
that time, Watts says he told Jones that he found no 
objection to that approach, just so long as the amount 
of money on the account was secure, to which Jones 
agreed. (R. 145, 146) According to the testimony of 
both Jones and Watts, this was the first mention of the 
name of J & R Products in connection with the guaranty. 
At the time this conversation took place, Associated Bolt 
was indebted to All Metals in the amount of at least 
$10,800.42. (PL Ex., 4) 
In October, 1972, Mr. Earl Osborne, President of 
All Metals, called Jones on two separate occasions. Os-
borne's uncontradicted testimony is that in both conver-
sations Jones stated that he was in the process of dis-
posing of some assets and when this was accomplished 
he would be able to pay the All Metals account. At no 
time during these conversations did Jones ever object to 
the payment of the debt nor did he deny being personally 
liable for the account; on the contrary, he agreed to send 
the money. (R. 175, 176, 177) 
After several requests for payment, All Metals brought 
this action. 
It should be noted here that for a period of at least 
eight months prior to the trial, Respondent repeatedly 
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attempted to obtain the deposition of A. Wayne Robinson. 
Appellants' counsel, on various occasions during this peri-
od, represented to Respondent's counsel that A. Wayne 
Robinson was seriously ill and could not have his depo-
sition taken. 
At the time of trial, A. Wayne Robinson was criti-
cally ill and was unavailable to testify. Appellants' coun-
sel was unable to state whether Mr. Robinson would ever 
be able to testify. (R. 208, 209) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THE 
BENEFIT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The law is well settled in virtually every jurisdiction 
that the statute of frauds "should be used for the purpose 
of preventing fraud and not as a shield by which frauds 
can be perpetrated." Jacobson v. Cox, et aL, 115 Utah 
102, 202 P2d 714, 720 (1949); Trollope v. Koerner, 
106 Ariz. 10, 470 P.2d 91 (1970); LeBlond v. Wolfe, 83 
C.A. 2d 282, 188 P.2d 278 (1948); Yucca Mining and 
Petroleum Company v. Howard C. Phillips Oil Company, 
69 N.Mex. 281, 365 P.2d 925 (1961). Appellants have, 
in effect, requested this Court to allow them to perpe-
trate a fraud on All Metals under the auspices of the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The Findings and Conclusions of the lower court, 
well supported by the facts, establish that All Metals is 
entitled to its judgment against Jones and Robinson under 
two types of estoppel, promissory estoppel and estoppel 
in pais. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the definition 
of promissory estoppel contained in §90 of the Restate-
ment of the Law of Contracts. As stated in Ravarino v. 
Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953) : 
A promise which the promissor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forebearance of a 
definite and substantial character on the part of 
the prpmissee and which does induce such action 
or forebearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by the enforcement of the promise. 
260 P.2d at 575. 
While historically the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel has been applied as a substitute for consideration, 
Id., this Court, along with many other jurisdictions, has 
extended the doctrine to situations involving the Statute 
of Frauds "when a misrepresentation as to the future 
operates as an abandonment of an existing right on the 
part of the party making the misrepresentation." [Cita-
tions omitted] Ravarino, supra, at 575. 
The promise to reduce an agreement to writing may 
be a suffiicent abandonment of an existing right to satisfy 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel if the element of 
fraud is sufficiently present. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 
386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956). 
In Easton v. Wycoff, supra, this Court enumerated 
the type of circumstance in which an offer to reduce a 
contract to writing is a sufficient abandonment of an 
existing right to support the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel. The Court quoted with approval comment f., Section 
178, A.L.I. Restatement of The Law of Contracts which 
reads, in appropriate part: 
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. . . and a promise to make a memorandum, if 
similarly relied on, may give rise to an effective 
promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise 
operate to defraud. [Emphasis supplied] 
In other words, the Restatement emphasizes 
the element of fraud and requires "substantial 
action" upon the promise to put the contract in 
writing in order for enforcement of the contract 
to be granted, and the cases appear to bear this 
out. 295 P.2d at 334. 
Although one may not be estopped from asserting 
the Statute of Frauds merely because an oral contract 
has been acted upon, there are circumstances in which 
reliance on an oral agreement gives rise to just such an 
estoppel. Appellants cite at Page 15 of their brief a por-
tion of 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes of Frauds, §567 which 
seemingly indicates that they are not so estopped. How-
ever, if the section is read in its entirety and in conjunc-
tion with the Restatement Section utilized by this Court 
in Easton v. Wycoff, supra, it is obvious that this case 
cries aloud for the application of the doctrine. 
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, §567 states in 
addition to the language cited in Appellants brief the 
following: 
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of 
frauds against a claim or defense based upon an 
oral contract is founded upon the general princi-
ples of estoppel in pais. [Citations omitted] The 
vital principle is that he who by his language or 
conduct leads another to do, upon the faith of an 
oral agreement, which he would not otherwise 
have done, and changes his position to his preju-
dice, will not be allowed to subject such person 
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to loss or injury, or to avail himself of the change 
to the prejudice of such other party. . . . It must 
be made to appear that there was such language 
or conduct on the part of the person against whom 
the estoppel is alleged as to make it a fraud for 
him to gainsay what he expressly admitted by 
his words or tacitly confessed by his silence. [Cita-
tions omitted] Actual intent or design to mislead 
or deceive is not, however, essential. . . . I t is clear, 
however, that an estoppel to assert the statute of 
frauds does not arise merely because an oral con-
tract within the statute has been acted upon by 
the promissee and not performed by the promissor. 
[Citations omitted] Neither does an estoppel arise 
upon the mere refusal to make a writing as agreed. 
[Citations omitted] Where the entire transaction 
leading up to the making of the verbal contract 
is open and free from fraud or false representa-
tion, the subsequent failure to carry out that 
contract cannot of itself constitute an estoppel; 
otherwise, the court would open the door to the 
nullification of the statute of frauds. [Citations 
omitted] But even though the failure to reduce to 
writing a contract as agreed does not ordinarily 
constitute such fraud as to estop a person from 
asserting the statute, yet if he is thereby induced 
to change his position in a substatnial respect, 
and so that such position cannot be restored, es-
toppel arises to preclude such assertion. [Citations 
omitted] [Emphasis supplied] 
Under the facts of the present case, there is much 
more than mere action on an oral contract. There is also 
much more than an offer to reduce a contract to a 
writing and a subsequent refusal to do so. Here Jones 
and Robinson guaranteed the account in question. Within 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
a few days of this conversation, All Metals began to 
sell goods on the strength of that guaranty. (PL Ex. 4) 
When a written guaranty was presented to him six 
weeks later, Jones did not make any objection to the fact 
that he was named on it nor did he say anything to Watts 
that would lead anyone to think the guaranty was not in 
effect. And he knew that merchandise was being shipped 
on a continuing basis (R. 203, 204, quoted in the State-
ment of Facts of this Brief). 
After Jones suggested changes to the first guaranty 
submitted to him (none of which went to question his 
own personal liability thereunder) a modified form was 
submitted to him on March 23, 1972. (R. 144; PL Ex. 3). 
Jones made no protest concerning the guaranty for three 
months thereafter, during which time All Metals con-
tinued to supply merchandise to Associated Bolt. By the 
time Jones got around to talking about the additional 
changes he wanted to make in the guaranty, the account 
was in excess of $10,000. (PL Ex. 4) 
Even at this late stage of the transaction, Watts made 
no objection to the requested change in the guaranty 
from Associaed Bolt & Supply Company to J & R Prod-
ucts, because it was Watts5 understanding that the guar-
anty would still cover the materials which were sold on 
this account. As stated by Watts in his testimony (R. 145, 
146): 
A. And his request was that he wanted to 
eliminate the name of Associated Bolt entirely 
from the document, and insert in its place J & R 
Products, the name J & R Products. And his reason 
for wanting to do this — 
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THE COURT: J & R what? 
THE WITNESS: J & R Products. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
A. (continuing) — and his reason for want-
ing to do this, naturally, was that he did not want 
to associate himself with any part of the Associ-
ated Bolt & Supply. And I told Mr. Jones that I 
found no objection to that approach, just so long 
as the amount of money on the account was secure. 
THE COURT: Was what? 
THE WITNESS: Was secure. 
THE COURT: Say that again, now. You 
told him — 
THE WITNESS: I told Mr. Jones that I 
took no objection to changing the name from 
Associated Bolt to J & R Products just so long as 
the business that had been done on the account 
was still secure. 
Q. What did he say to that? 
A. Fine. He agreed. 
Q. So then what happened? 
A. Then the document, of course, was sent 
to us and we received it sometime in the month 
of June. 
Q. When you received it, was it changed in 
the manner that it is now changed by pen and ink? 
A. Yes. 
At this time All Metals was still operating on the 
reasonable belief that Jones and Robinson had guaran-
teed its account with Associated Bolt. 
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In uncontradicted testimony, Earl Osborne, an offi-
cer of All Metals, stated that in two separate telephone 
conversations he had with Jones in October, 1972, Jones 
stated that he was in the process of disposing of some 
assets and when this was accomplished he would be able 
to send All Metals a check. (R. 175, 176, 177). 
At no time during the entire course of dealings be-
tween the parties did Jones ever repudiate the initial 
oral guaranty. He was aware that goods had been sold 
and at no time did he ever state that those goods were 
not guaranteed by him. In fact the first time All Metals 
learned that Jones considered the guaranty inoperative 
was when it received his Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The above enumerated conduct also gives rise to an 
estoppel in pais. As stated in §567 of 73 Am. Jur. 2d 
supra, the doctrine of estoppel to assert the statutes of 
frauds is founded upon the general principles of estoppel 
in pais. In this case, all the elements of estoppel in pais 
have been met. 
As stated in Grover, et al v. Gam, et al, 23 Utah 2d 
441, 464P.2d 598 (1970), 
. . . that under the doctrine or principle of estop-
pel in pais one may by his acts or conduct away 
from the court prevent himself from denying in 
court the effect or result of those acts. We respect 
a definition of long standing taken from Black's 
Law Dictionary: 
An estoppel by the conduct or admissions of 
a party * * * it is, and always was, a familiar 
principle in the law of contracts. It lies at the 
foundation of morals and is a cardinal point 
in the exposition of promises, that one shall be 
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bound by the state of facts which he has in-
duced another to act upon. 464 P.2d at 602 
In the instant case, the facts go beyond the mere 
application of promissory estoppel. The subsequent repre-
sentation and the silence of Jones with knowledge that 
goods were being sold on the strength of the guaranty 
establish a series of acts or conduct which induced All 
Metals to act. Jones is bound by the state of those facts 
and by his conduct away from court and is prevented 
from denying in court the effect or result of those acts. 
The Appellant has cited in its brief three Utah cases 
involving the principles of estoppel, Ravarino v. Price, 
supra; Easton v. Wycoff, supra, and McKinnon v. The 
Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, Utah 2d, 529 P.2d 
434 (1974) [incorrectly cited in Appellants Brief as Mal-
colm v. The Corporation, etc.]. Each of these cases, al-
though setting forth the law with respect to promissory 
estoppel as it applies to the statute of frauds, held against 
the application of the doctrine in the particular factual 
circumstances. 
In Easton v. Wycoff, the court held that the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel did not apply because there was 
insufficient reliance and injury as required by the doc-
trine, 295 P.2d at 335. In all three cases, the facts were 
far less favorable for the application of the doctrine 
than in the present case. Also, there were no facts which 
would support the application of the doctrine of estoppel 
in pais. 
In none of the aforementioned Utah cases was there 
established a series of representations or omissions fol-
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lowed by a course of conduct between the parties which 
extended over many months and which was justifiably 
relied upon. Each of the above cases contained only an 
initial set of representations and then a subsequent reli-
ance with no continuous reliance and a course of dealing 
established thereafter. 
From the foregoing, it has been amply demonstrated 
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel and estoppel 
in pais should apply to the facts herein and Defendants 
should be estopped to rely upon the statute of frauds as 
a defense. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND DIS-
CRETION IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT. 
Defendants' concede that whether or not to allow 
an amendment of a complaint is within the discretion 
of the trial court. Under the terms of Rule 15 (a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend a com-
plaint shall be freely given when justice so requires. Also, 
the Appellate Court will not ordinarily disturb the ruling 
of the lower court unless it is apparent that such court 
has abused its discretion. Johnson v. Continental Casualty 
Company, 78 Utah 18, 22, 300 Pac. 1032 (1931). 
Defendants contend in their brief that they were prej-
udiced by the allowance of the amendment in two ways: 
(1) because they could not confer on the matter with 
Robinson, and (2) because they were not allowed to 
undertake discovery with respect to the claim. 
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With respect to the first claim, the Defendants state 
that they were prejudiced because they were unable to 
consult Robinson, the President of Associated Bolt, with 
respect to the new theory that was alleged in the amend-
ment. Counsel for Defendants states that "in addition to 
being a party, he [meaning Robinson] would have been 
an important witness and Defendants were entitled to a 
reasonable opportunity to have him present if the case 
were to be tried on the oral guaranty." (Appellants Brief, 
Page 8) Counsel makes no representation as to the nature 
of Robinson's testimony. 
Appellant then cites the portion of the court record 
wherein the trial court establishes that at the time of 
trial Robinson was unavailable because of his physical 
condition. However, it was established then by the ad-
mission of Defendants' counsel that at the time of trial 
counsel had no idea whether Robinson would ever be 
available at any future date. 
Defendants' counsel intimates that if the trial court 
would have given him a reasonable amount of time, he 
would have been able to produce Robinson. Such is not 
the case. 
Although not part of the record, counsel for the 
Plaintiff can represent to the Court that for several 
months prior to the time of trial, Plaintiff's counsel 
made repeated attempts to take the deposition of Robin-
son. Counsel has in its file a copy of a letter from Robin-
son's doctor, dated April 11, 1974, stating that Robinson 
was currently incapacitated. That letter was sent to 
Plaintiff's counsel by the counsel for Defendants in order 
to satisfy Plaintiff's demands that Robinson be produced 
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for his deposition. Further, the letter which Defendants' 
counsel sent states that Robinson had been acutely ill 
since the fall of 1973, a year prior to the date of trial 
Respondents' counsel can and does represent to this 
Court that for a period of time of at least eight months 
prior to the time of trial, it was repeatedly represented 
to them by the counsel for Defendants that Robinson 
was critically ill and could not be made aavilable for his 
deposition. 
These matters were extensively discussed with the 
trial judge in chambers prior to the beginning of the 
trial. (R. 135) From the foregoing, it is obvious, that at 
the time of the trial, there was no possible representation 
which Defendants could make to the Court which would 
indicate that Robinson would ever be available for the 
taking of his deposition. To continue the trial at that 
particular time for this reason would have meant to con-
tinue the trial for an indefinite period of time. It should 
be noted that in the Judge's opening remarks (R. 134) 
the Judge stated that if the Defendant was handicapped 
because of the amendment, it was the Court's intention 
to grant a short continuance to allow the Defendant to 
properly prepare. At the termination of the trial, as is 
amply shown in the record, the Defendants could make 
on showing whatsoever that there was any available evi-
dence or any prejudice resultant from the granting of 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend its Complaint. (R. 208-210) 
Appellants' second contention is that if the theory set 
forth in the Second Amended Complaint would have 
been brought forth at an earlier time, they may have 
conducted further discovery. 
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It should be noted that the entire evidence upon which 
the decision of the lower court is based was available to 
both the Defendants' counsel and the Defendants them-
selves long before the trial date. 
For example, the conversation upon which the oral 
guaranty is based took place in the presence of both 
Defendants and their counsel, Mr. Peck. Surely, De-
fendants' counsel cannot claim surprise from evidence 
which was introduced from a conversation at which he 
was present. All other representations and conversations 
mentioned in the record involve Farrell J. Jones. Other 
than Jones' denial that he audibly agreed to guarantee 
the account in the initial January conversation of the 
parties, Mr. Jones was unable to contradict any of the 
testimony given by Watts, Osborne and Curtis. 
None of the evidence produced at trial was new in 
the sense of applying only to Plaintiffs' theory of oral 
guaranty. The amendment brought in no new facts or 
circumstances, but only applied a different legal theory 
to the same facts of which the Defendants and their 
counsel were already aware. 
The trial court was fully informed of the circum-
stances surrounding the amendment of the complaint. 
The trial court had extensive discussions prior to the 
trial with the counsel for the parties with respect to the 
Amendment to the Complaint and the availability of 
the disputed witness. The trial court was fully informed 
as to the circumstances surrounding the Amendment of 
the Complaint and under the circumstances set forth 
above, this Court should not overturn the informed 
judgment of the lower court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
POINT III. 
THE WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVI-
DENCE AMPLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT AN ORAL GUARANTY WAS 
MADE BY FARRELL J. JONES. 
In Appellants' brief it is contended that because of 
the testimony of Jones that he did not consent to guar-
anteeing the account, the weight of the evidence resolves 
the dispute in favor of the fact that there was no oral 
guaranty. 
It should be pointed out that the testimony of the 
three witnesses for the Plaintiff was virtually uncontra-
dicted, except with respect to the statement made by 
Mr. Jones that he did not state in the initial conversation 
that he would guarantee the account. All other facts, 
including the transmittal of the proposed guarantees, the 
telephone conversations, the sale of goods and all other 
factors which constitute Plaintiff's case are uncontra-
dicted. Respondent submits that if one looks at the record 
in its entirety and considers the admitted acts of Defend-
ant Jones, the only theory which is consistent with those 
acts is that Jones orally guaranteed the account with the 
Plaintiff, that he intended that his agreement be evi-
denced in writing and that he acted throughout as though 
he thought he was liable. 
The weight and sufficiency of the evidence is over-
whelmingly in support of the lower court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
It is quite clear that the evidence supports the posi-
tion that Jones and Robinson orally agreed to guarantee 
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the account owed by Associated Bolt to All Metals. That 
in reliance thereon All Metals began to ship merchan-
dise to Associated Bolt. That despite repeated opportuni-
ties Jones never gave any hint that he claimed he was 
not liable on his guaranty and that Jones and Robinson 
are now estopped to deny their liability by asserting the 
Statute of Frauds. 
The Judge did not err by allowing Plaintiff's Com-
plaint to be amended, since Appellants' were not preju-
diced in their defense to the claim. 
The weight and sufficiency of the evidence clearly 
supports the findings and judgment of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARDIN A. WHITNEY 
JEFFREY N. CLAYTON 
of the firm of 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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